The following assertions represent Kuhn’s contribution to a discussion on meta-knowing, specifically metacognitive knowing and metastrategic knowing:
8.72 Meta-knowing is a broad term to describe knowledge of cognition including personal theories about knowing capabilities.
8.73 Meta-knowing includes reflective awareness and understanding of the content of cognition and the influence of monitoring, control and self-regulation on cognition.
8.74 Meta-knowing is categorised as metacognitive knowing or competence or operations (declarative knowing - knowing that) and metastrategic knowing (or competence, operations, understanding) or procedural meta-knowing (procedural knowing - knowing how).
8.75 Metacognitive knowing is knowing about and reflection on objects of knowledge, including beliefs about this knowledge.
8.76 Metacognitive knowing is subdivided into ‘specific and situational’ and ‘general and abstract’ knowledge.
8.77 General and abstract knowledge includes epistemological meta-knowing or epistemic cognition.
8.78 Epistemological meta-knowing is a person’s wider understanding of knowing and includes personal and impersonal knowledge.
8.79 Metastrategic knowing involves knowledge about cognitive processes including strategy selection, application, effectiveness and limitations in different tasks.
8.80 Metastrategic knowledge consists of two components – knowledge of task objectives or metatask and knowledge of strategies or metastrategic understanding.
8.81 Knowledge of task objectives involves knowledge, understanding and awareness of the task including its nature, structure, goals and objectives.
8.82 Knowledge of task objectives facilitates selection and application of task specific strategies and task completion.
8.83 Knowledge of strategies is the awareness and understanding of the applicability of strategies for a particular task which address task objectives.
8.84 The relationship between metacognitive and metastrategic knowing is influenced by the specific task.
8.85 Epistemological meta-knowing (epistemological or epistemic understanding) is a component of metacognitive or declarative knowing and important for metacognitive development.
See other related assertions on page 151 in the book The Taxonomy of Metacognition.